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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff and : 
Respondent, 
vs Case No. 14384 
CURTIS GARFIELD, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The State of Utah charged that defendant committed 
the crime of a felony of the third degree by carrying a 
concealed weapon, a firearm. At arraignment, defendant 
entered a plea of not guilty. After plea bargaining, 
defendant withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a 
plea of guilty. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Based upon the guilty plea of defendant, the lower 
court entered its Judgment that the defendant be confined 
in the Utah State Prison for a term of not more than 
five (5) years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant, who appeals from the judgment of con-
viction entered upon his plea of guilty, seeks the re-
versal of his conviction, enforcement of his plea bargain 
or the vacating of his sentence, as detailed in the Argu-
ment portion of this Brief. In the alternative, and in 
the event this Court concludes that the record herein 
lacks facts essential to the proper and complete disposi-
tion of his case, defendant seeks remand to the District 
Court for an evidentiary hearing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 8, 1975, defendant was charged by Complaint 
filed in the City Court of Provo City, County of Utah, 
State of Utah with committing the crime of a felony in 
the third degree by carrying a concealed weapon, a fire-
arm. (R-38). A preliminary hearing was held on July 31, 
1975 and at the conclusion thereof, defendant was ordered 
bound,over to the District Court for further proceedings. 
(R-30). 
On August 29, 1975 defendant was arraigned before 
the District Court. Defendant received a copy of the 
Information (R-27), was advised of his rights and to the 
.2. 
charges contained in the Information, defendant pleaded 
not guilty. Trial was set for October 20, 1975 with a 
jury. (R-26). 
Between July 31, 1975 and October 21, 1975 defend-
ant's counsel had various plea bargain conversations 
with the prosecutors and discussed defendant's problem 
of alcoholism. The prosecutors were informed that de-
fendant was an alcoholic undergoing treatment at Raleigh 
Hills Hospital, 1255 East 3900 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. (Transcript of Proceedings - 12, 18 and 19). In 
these conversations defendant's counsel urged that the 
plea bargain be improved in view of defendant's alco-
holism. Defendant's counsel urged that defendant be 
allowed to plea nolo contendere to a misdemeanor. The 
prosecutors responded that before a lesser charge would 
be considered, a representative of Raleigh Hills Hospital 
would have to convince the arresting officers that de-
fendant was conscientiously seeking help and responding 
favorably to treatment. Conversations were subsequently 
held between Scott U. Miller, a representative of Raleigh 
Hills Hospital, and the arresting officers. 
In a telephone conference held on October 20, 1975, 
Carl J. Nemelka, one of the prosecutors, told defendant's 
counsel that he could not reduce the charges against 
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defendant but if defendant would enter a guilty plea, 
the prosecutor's office would make a strong recommen-
dation to the Court that defendant not be sentenced to 
jail if he does not drink and continued treatment at 
Raleigh Hills Hospital. Mr. Nemelka acknowledged that 
the recommendation of his office would not bind the 
Court, but expressed his opinion that the Court would 
not act contrary to such recommendation. (Transcript 
of Proceedings - 12). 
In a conference held the following day, Mr. Nemelka 
told defendant's counsel that if defendant would plead 
guilty, he, Mr. Nemelka, would recommend probation and 
that the Court xrould follow the recommendation. Mr. 
Nemelka stated that under the circumstances, the Court 
would not want defendant to serve jail time if he refrain-
ed from drinking and would keep on the Raleigh Hills 
Hospital program. (Transcript of Proceedings - 18), 
The assurances of the prosecutor were transmitted 
to defendant by his counsel and based thereupon defendant 
withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a plea of guilty 
to the Information. (Transcript of Proceedings - 19; 
R-24). 
Judgment was pronounced on November 21, 1975 by 
Judge Maurice Harding. Contrary to the assurance made 
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by the prosecutor to defendant's counsel, the Court sen-
tenced the defendant to serve not more than five (5) 
years in the Utah State Prison. Defendant's counsel, 
thereupon, moved that the Court allow defendant to with-
draw his guilty plea on the ground that the plea was 
entered by defendant based upon an assurance from the 
prosecutor that if the defendant pleaded guilty, he 
would be placed on probation. The Court ordered that 
the motion be held in abeyance until a transcript of 
previous hearings could be prepared and allowed defend-
ant to file his Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea in writ-
ing. (Pv-23) . The Motion was filed by defendant on 
December 18, 1975. (R-15). 
Defendant's Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea was 
argued before Judge Allen B. Sorensen on December 19, 
1975. The Motion was denied. 
At that hearing the prosecutor acknowledged that 
he had not, prior to the sentencing of defendant, rec-
ommended to the Court that defendant be placed on pro-
bation. (Transcript of Proceedings - 13). 
Defendant contends that the failure by the prose-
cutor to recommend to the Court that defendant be placed 
on probation goes to the very heart of the plea bargain 
and constitutes a ground upon which the Judgments of 
.5. 
Judges Harding and Sorensen should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROSECUTOR PROMISED TO RECOMMEND TO THE COURT 
THAT THE DEFENDANT BE PLACED ON PROBATION AND DID 
NOT DO SO 
As detailed in the Statement of Facts above, defen-
dant withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a plea of 
guilty based upon the promise made by the prosecutor that 
he would recommend to the Court that defendant serve no 
jail time if he refrained from drinking and completed 
the alcoholism program at Raleigh Hills Hospital. There-
after, the prosecutor violated his promise by failing 
to give the promised recommendation regarding defendant 
to the Court. (Transcript of Proceedings - 13). 
As a result of the failure of the prosecutor to 
fulfill his commitment, defendant is entitled relief 
under the authority of Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 
257 (1971), and United States v. Brown, 500 F.2d. 374 
(4th Cir. 1974). In both cited cases, convictions were 
reversed because of the failure of the prosecutors to 
adhere to their promises as to what they would recommend 
at the time of sentencing. 
In Santobello v. New York, a new prosecutor appar-
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ently ignorant of his predecessor's commitment to refrain 
from making a sentencing recommendation, instead recom-
mended the maximum sentence of one (1) year for defendant. 
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction. Mr. Chief 
Justice Berger, writing for the majority, stated: 
This phase of the process of criminal 
justice and the adjudicative element 
inherent in accepting a plea of guilty, 
must be attended by safeguards to insure 
the defendant what is reasonably due in 
the circumstances. Those circumstances 
will vary, but a constant factor is that 
when a plea rests in any significant de-
gree on a promise or agreement of the 
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be 
part of the inducement or consideration, 
such promise must be fulfilled. 404 U.S. 
at 262. 
In United States v. Brown, the defendant entered into 
a plea bargain whereby he pleaded guilty to the charge of 
possession of stolen mail in consideration of dismissal 
of a forgery charge and a recommendation by the Govern-
ment that he receive a sentence of three years to be 
served at Lorton concurrently with the unexpired portion 
of another sentence. He was, instead, sentenced to a 
term of four years without recommendation that it be 
served at Lorton. At sentencing, a prosecutor other than 
the one xvho entered into the plea bargain merely brought 
the plea bargain to the attention of the Court but made 
no recommendation as had been promised. The Court of 
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Appeals reversed on the ground that the "half-hearted" re-
commendation of the new prosecutor did not comply with 
the plea bargain and that it made no difference that de-
fense counsel had brought the reasons for the plea bargain 
to the attention of the sentencing Court. Holding that 
the effect on the sentencing Court of the noncompliance 
with the plea bargain was ua matter into which we need 
not inquire,11 the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded 
for sentencing in accordance with the prosecutor's recom-
mendation. Calling such action necessary for specific 
enforcement of the plea bargain to which the defendant was 
entitled, the Court wrote: 
In determing the significance of the prosecu-
tors failure to fulfill the promise contained 
in the plea bargain in Santobello, the Su-
preme Court did not inquire into the reasons 
for the breach; nor do we. We have no reason 
to think that the bargain was breached as a 
result of anything more than the failure of 
the first prosecutor to inform the second, 
and the second's complete candor in respond-
ing to the inquiry of the district court. 
But in Santobello, hinging reversal on the 
breach of the agreement alone, the Court at-
tached no weight to the fact that the failure 
to comply with the plea bargain had been in-
advertent. 
f,The staff lawyers in the prosecutor's 
office have the burden of 'letting 
the left hand know what the right 
hand is doing' or has done. That the 
breach of agreement was inadvertent 
does not lessen its impact." 404 
U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499. 
.8. 
The test established to be applied by us is thus 
an objective one-whether the plea bargain agree-
ment has been breached or not-irrespective 
of prosecutorial motivations or justifications 
for failure in performance. 500 F.2d at 378. 
The failure by the prosecutor to recommend to the 
Court that defendant be placed on probation prior to the 
Court entering judgment on defendant here went to the very 
heart of the plea bargain, namely that probation would be 
recommended and that the recommendation of the prosecutor 
would be accepted and enforced by the District Court. In 
this respect, the prosecutor's lapse was even more basic 
than those in Santobello and Brown, which went to the con-
tent of the recommendation to the Court. Therefore, the 
defendant here is entitled to the relief ordered by Santo-
bello and Brown. 
POINT II 
IT WAS IMPROPER FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO ACCEPT A 
GUILTY PLEA PURSUANT TO A PLEA BARGAIN AND THEN SEN-
TENCE CONTRARY TO THE PLEA BARGAIN WITHOUT GIVING 
DEFENDANT AN OPPORTUNITY TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA 
Defendant's counsel and the prosecutor engaged in ne-
gotiations culminating in a plea bargain whereby defendant 
pleaded guilty to the Information. Under these circum-
stances, the Court should have been advised of the plea 
bargaining. The Court would thereafter be obliged to 
follow the prosecutor's recommendation or inform defendant 
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that it would not do so and allow him an opportunity to 
withdraw his plea. The failure of the Court to permit 
defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty requires this 
Court to vacate defendant's sentence and remand the case 
for sentencing in accordance with the prosecutor's re-
commendation. See Santobello v. New York and United States 
v. Brown. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S CHANGE OF PLEA WAS BASED UPON THE AS-
SURANCES OF THE PROSECUTOR AND WAS, THEREFORE, NOT 
VOLUNTARY 
At the time that defendant withdrew his not guilty 
plea and entered a plea of guilty, the Court asked the 
defendant if he had been promised anything if he entered 
a plea of guilty. The Court also asked the defendant if 
he understood that the Court was not bound by agreements 
made between the prosecutor and defense counsel. (Tran-
script of Proceedings - 5 and 6). 
The ritual assertion by the Court below that it 
was not bound by the plea bargain does not offset an 
otherwise misleading impression. This was the holding in 
Walters v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 1129 (1973). Walters, a petitioner under 
28 U.S.C. §2255, claimed that he was induced into pleading 
.10. 
guilty by the prosecutor's unkept promise that he would 
receive a ten-year sentence and that he had been sentenced 
to 20 years in prison instead. This Court stated: 
If Walters was in fact promised by the Assis-
tant United States Attorney that he would re-
ceive a ten-year sentence, he is entitled to 
relief. United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d. 
426 (4th Cir. 1972). Sentencing Walters was 
within the authority of no one but the trial 
judge. An assurance by another that Walters 
would receive a particular sentence, there-
fore, would be a promise that could not be 
kept. An unkept bargain which has induced a 
guilty plea is grounds for relief. Santobello 
v. New York, 404, U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 
L.Ed 2d 42/ (1971). 460 F.2d at 991-92. 
At arraignment, the trial court questioned Walters closely 
as to whether anyone had made any promises to him. The 
Court then asked: 
THE COURT: Do you fully understand that the 
court, and the court alone, is responsible 
under the law for any sentence that is imposed 
upon a defendant who pleads guilty or if found 
guilty, do you fully understand that? 
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. Id. at 992. 
As to the significance of the quoted question and answer, 
this Court stated: 
It is doubtful that the trial judge's instruction 
that the length of Walters1 sentence was within 
his sole control would have eradicated the effect 
of the prosecutor's alleged promise to Walters. 
Ibid. 
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case 
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for further factual inquiry by the District Court. Rever-
sal is similarly required in the instant case. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT WAS MISLEAD BY THE PROSECUTOR INTO BELIEVING 
HIS PLEA BARGAIN WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE COURT 
As detailed in the Statement of Facts above, defendant 
was mislead by the prosecutor into believing that the Court 
would accept his plea bargain. The acts which mislead him 
include the assurance from the prosecutor that under the 
circumstances of this case, the Court would not want the 
defendant to serve jail time. (Transcript of Proceedings -
18) . 
As a result of the misleading impression which was 
conveyed to him, defendant entered his plea of guilty. The 
actions of the prosecutor require the specific enforcement 
of defendant's plea bargain as set forth in Clemons v. 
United States, 137 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1943). In demons, 
the defendant was assured by an Assistant United States 
Attorney that the indictment oh which he went to trial 
charged only a misdemeanor and that the maximum sentence 
was one (1) year. The trial judge, however, construed the 
indictment as charging a felony and, after conviction, 
imposed a sentence of four (4) years. On appeal, the Court 
of Appeals held that the prosecutors assurances to the de~ 
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fendant as to the possible future punishment in the 
event of conviction required reversal and, in addition, 
rejected the Government's argument that the defendant was 
not prejudiced since he was convicted after trial. The 
Court wrote: 
It may well be that Clemons and his counsel acted 
a bit precipitately in accepting this assurance 
at its face value and in proceeding accordingly. 
It does not follow that they, therefore, acted 
altogether unreasonably. Certainly, the whole 
procedure smacks of surprise, which should if 
possible avoided. 
A criminal trial is not, of course, to be likened 
to a game....We think accordingly, that Clemons, 
under the circumstances of this case, was de-
prived of his liberty against the spirit, if not 
the letter, of the Due Process Clause of the 
Constitution of the United States, We think he 
has been dealt with unfairly in the light of our 
standards of justice towards those accused of 
federal crimes - standards, in our opinion, 
which the courts must always adequately safe-
guard and must, under all circumstances, zeal-
ously protect. 137 F.2d. at 305-306. 
CONCLUSION 
As a result of the errors commited below, defendant 
respectfully submits that he is entitled to relief as 
follows: 
ERROR RELIEF 
I. Failure of Prosecutor Set aside defendant's guilty 
to Recommend Probation plea and sentence; in the al-
ternative, remand for an evi-
dentiary hearing. 
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II. Failure to Sentence 
Defendant in Accor-
dance With Plea Bar-
gain 
III. Defendant!s Change 
of Pleas was Not Vol-
untary 
Specific enforcement of plea 
bargain; in the alternative, 
remand for an evidentiary 
hearing. 
Set aside defendant's guilty 
plea and sentence; in the al-
ternative remand for an evi-
dentiary hearing. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THOMAS R. BLONQUIST 
Second Floor 
Metropolitan Law Building 
431 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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